Monday, December 24, 2007

Some Reflections on Ethics

Introduction

My original interest in philosophy was stimulated by ethics. I became interested in ethics through my interest in social and political problems. In fact, I came to philosophy in search of a rational morality, at least as rational as possible. I believed, and still believe, that scientific method is the best method for resolving factual disagreements and arriving at conclusions regarding what is the case. However, I could not accept that the denotation of the term rational was the same as the denotation of the term scientific. I believed that there could be a method, not scientific in the empirical sense, yet rational, for resolving ethical disagreements or disagreements regarding what ought to be. The fact that the scientific method alone could not solve the fundamental problems of values, so I thought, in no way reduced the importance of such problems. They remain as fundamental and important as ever. On the other hand, the fact that the scientific method alone could not give an answer to the fundamental questions of ethics did not reduce in any way the importance of scientific method in the sphere of facts. I had hoped that studying philosophy could help me in finding a rational method for resolving ethical disagreements or, in other words, in arriving at a rational morality. A technical discussion of my ethical ideas is contained in the critical part of my research-paper “The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell” which is based on my book of the same title.
However, my ethical ideas are interwoven in all of my important philosophical writings, even when they do not deal directly or specifically with ethics. For example, in my Hindi work, Andhvishwas ke Virudh (Against Blind Faith), I have said:

A rationalist also rejects the rigid and divisive morality based on blind faith in religious scriptures and on unreasonable and unscientific beliefs like God, heaven, hell and rebirth. He or she uses reasoning in the sphere of ethics as well, and accepts a rational morality based on human desires and needs.

I have discussed religion and ethics in the last part of Andhvishwas ke Virudh. I have emphasized the need for delinking morality from religion. I have granted that every religion includes some moral ideas about “right” and “wrong”. However, this religious morality, I have maintained, is not based on logical and scientific thinking, but on faith and fear. It is not explained rationally why a particular action is “right” or “wrong”. On the contrary, the religious morality is sought to be enforced on the basis of beliefs like God, heaven, hell, etc. Blind faith in religious scriptures is the cornerstone of religious morality. Because of this blind faith in religious scriptures, the orthodox people often dogmatically cling to ethical ideas, which are not related to human needs, desires and to contemporary knowledge.
It is quite possible that certain actions, which have been called “right” in different religions, could also be considered “right” from an independent rationalist point of view. Nevertheless, on the other hand, different religions have sanctioned actions, which are totally wrong from a rationalist standpoint. For example, most of the religions have dual moral standards for man and woman, which go against the ideal of gender-equality. In Hindu religion, sanction has been provided to evils like varna-vyavastha and untouchability. In short, I have maintained that religious morality is illogical, narrow, inadequate and divisive. I have advocated a new, secular morality based on logical thinking and on facts arrived at by using the scientific method.
Ethics, according to me, is a human creation and a social need. Morality is inherent in the rational and social nature of human beings. Therefore, we can base human morality on such basic human needs and desires, which are shared by all human beings. Once we admit that the life, happiness and freedom of every human being is valuable in itself, we can judge the rightness or wrongness of human actions and moral rules on this basis. Such actions and moral rules, which increase the life, happiness and freedom of every individual, are right; and actions and moral rules, which take us in reverse direction, are wrong.
In my Kya Ishwar mar chuka hai? (Is God Dead?), I have emphasized freedom of will and moral responsibility while criticizing the God-idea. I have asserted that instead of shifting their responsibilities on “God” and “fate”, human beings must take their own decisions with a full sense of responsibility and face the consequences of their actions in a bold manner. One of my reasons for opposing the God-idea is that it obstructs the growth of genuine morality by discouraging critical thinking in the sphere of ethics. I have maintained that there is no room for freedom of the will in a consistent theism. The idea of an omnipotent God knocks the bottom out of ethics by denying freedom of will.
In my Why I am Not a Hindu, I have evaluated and criticized the Hindu varna-vyavastha (four-fold division of Hindu society) on the basis of the democratic and human values of liberty, equality and fraternity.
However, I have presented my ethical ideas in a more technical way in my “The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell”. To begin with, I have supported Russell’s ethical non-cognitivism or the view that ethical statements cannot be true or false like factual ones. As I have said:
It appears to me that, as far as Russell's non-cognitivism is concerned, his arguments are incontrovertible. He is right in maintaining that in ethical disagreements of fundamental nature we cannot give arguments or evidence of the kind we can in scientific and factual disagreements. In addition, that this is so because ethical statements are not indicative, though they have been confused as such by a long line of ethical philosophers. A statement like "We ought to pursue happiness as an end" or "Happiness is good in itself" is not a factual one, because it does not assert what is the case but recommends what ought to be the case.
We call a factual statement true if there is a corresponding fact. However, since ethical statements do not state facts, there is no question of there being a corresponding fact or the statement being true or false in the sense in which factual statements are.
Once we grant that non-cognitivism is true, we also have to admit that the attempts made by different cognitivist philosophers were misdirected to some extent, and that we have to make attempts in somewhat different direction, if we are to solve the problems of ethics at all.
Ethics, it is true, owing to the very nature of its problems cannot be objective in the sense in which physical sciences are. This, however, does not mean that reason has no role to play in ethical matters. As far as means are concerned, reason certainly plays a role. Moreover, even the ends need not be totally arbitrary. Both ends and means have to be compatible with the reality. Besides, we could derive the ends from the common desires of all or a majority of human beings. In this way, we could arrive at an objective ethics, not objective in the sense of being independent of human desires, but objective in the sense of being independent of desires of a particular individual at a particular time. Though ethics cannot be independent of human desires - in fact, the demand for ethics totally independent of human desires is irrational in the sense that it is based on inadequate understanding of the nature of ethics - it certainly can be independent of desires of a particular individual at a particular time. In his Human Society in Ethics and Politics, Russell tried to give objectivity to ethics by basing it on the common desires of all or the majority of human beings. He was needlessly apologetic about his formulations because he had the ideal of physical sciences in his mind. Ethical ends are, after all, human ends, and there would be no ethics in a world devoid of human beings. The fact that the scientific method alone is not capable of solving the fundamental problems of ethics in no way undermines the importance either of the scientific method or of the problems of ethics. We have only to realize that the logic of ethical discourse is different from the logic of scientific discourse, and we have to investigate what that logic is. It appears to me that in case of fundamental ethical statements like "Happiness is good" the criterion of correspondence with facts has to be replaced by "in accordance with fundamental human desires". We may say that if the statement "Happiness is good" is in accordance with fundamental human desires, it is an "ethically sound" statement to make, even if it cannot be called "true" in the factual sense. In fact, I think it is an ethically sound statement keeping in mind the nature and function of ethical ideas as well as the fundamentals of human nature and the factual reality. To put it simply, life and happiness (satisfaction of desires) are good because all or almost all human beings desire it. Treating this as an axiom - and this is not an arbitrary one - we can derive the rest of ethics by applying reason and scientific method. In this way, we can develop a rational, secular and human ethics.
In the context of ancient Indian philosophy, my ethical ideas are closest to Lokayat, but, as is obvious from the foregoing discussion, I do not accept the Lokayat view in totality. Like Lokayat, I reject moksha (liberation from the so-called cycle of birth and death) or attainment of heaven as ethical ideals. Again, like Lokayat, I support hedonism. However, I do not support egoistic hedonism totally. My ethics is a refined version of both “egoistic’ and “altruistic” hedonism or utilitarianism. “Refined”, not in the sense of making a distinction between “physical” and “mental” pleasures, and favoring “mental” pleasure; but “refined” in the logical sense, that is, suitably modified to meet valid objections.
Before I conclude this introduction, I want to add a few more words to make things easier for my readers. In this introduction, I have summarized my ethical ideas as found in my earlier writings. Even this introduction is largely based on what I had to say about ethics in the concluding chapter, “Some Critical Comments”, of my Rationalism, Humanism and Atheism in Twentieth Century Indian Thought. The chapter “On Buddha”, too, is based on what I have said about Buddhism in the same chapter of the same book. The first chapter, “The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell” was written by me much earlier. Since I have already summarized my main original ideas of the paper in this introduction, the readers will have to bear with some repetition, while reading this chapter. All the other six chapters of this book have been written in October month of 2007 exclusively for this book only. Those of my readers who are not much interested in the technical aspects of ethics may skip the first three chapters in their first reading, or they may start with the last chapter, “Some False Dichotomies”, which I wrote first and enjoyed writing the most.

(The e book will be pubilished shortly on the website of the Buddhiwadi Foundation http://www.buddhiwadi.org/)

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